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What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? 
Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics
Wojciech Konończuk, Tadeusz A. Olszański
The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian 
cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have 
now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship 
and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from 
Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take 
over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that 
the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to dispu-
tes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led mo-
vement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of 
the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition 
has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then.
Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians 
– raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but 
nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and 
a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait 
out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for 
both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely 
limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.
It should be expected that in the coming months 
the social discontent witnessed at the Maidan 
protests will continue to intensify, gradually 
becoming a regular feature of Ukrainian poli-
tics. Even if the authorities were to opt for the 
use of force to end the protests, this would not 
only fail to solve the political crisis – it would 
in fact significantly exacerbate it. The group of 
disgruntled and frustrated citizens calling for 
a complete overhaul of Ukraine’s political life 
is growing in strength. Meanwhile, prepara-
tions for the upcoming presidential elections 
are already in progress at both ends of the po-
litical spectrum. The opposition camp is being 
represented by three political parties, divided 
by their differing interests and the ambitions of 
their leaders, and by a civil society wishing to 
institutionalise its actions. The ruling camp, on 
the other hand, has been focusing its domestic 
and foreign policy efforts on ensuring victory 
in the presidential election at all costs. A clash 
of these very different attitudes, value systems 
and goals seems inevitable. The outcome of the 
presidential elections in early 2015, and there-
fore also the path Ukraine will take in the future, 
effectively hinges on the public reaction to the 
expected electoral fraud. It therefore follows 
that the most important test for the Ukrainian 
civil movement that emerged at the end of 2013 
is still to come.
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The outbreak of the protests
The first protests against the government’s de-
cision not to sign an Association Agreement 
with the EU were staged on 21 November by 
students from Kyiv, Lviv and several other cit-
ies in western Ukraine. These protests were 
non-political and intentionally non-partisan. 
From the very beginning, only Ukrainian and 
EU flags have appeared at what have come 
to be known as the Euromaidan rallies, and 
representatives of political parties have often 
been prevented from addressing the crowds. 
The protests began as spontaneous grassroots 
demonstrations, without the involvement of 
any organisations, and the key role in the pro-
cess was played by informal social activists and 
student leaders, aided by social media. Support 
from a number of celebrities, including the 
singer Ruslana Lyzhychko, also proved import-
ant. The demonstrations were motivated above 
all by a desire to bring Ukraine closer to Europe, 
and by the idealistic belief that an Association 
Agreement with Brussels would rapidly im-
prove the standards of government in Ukraine 
and facilitate visa-free travel to the EU.
The rallies were organised in the hope that they 
would force the government to steer a more 
pro-EU course. When it became clear that this 
would not happen, the protests began to die 
down and would most likely have fizzled out 
completely had it not been for the violent 
crackdown on the few remaining protesters in 
the Maidan in Kyiv carried out by the Berkut riot 
police on 30 November. This failed to intimidate 
the protesters and instead caused a sharp rise in 
anti-government sentiment, reignited the pro-
tests, and prompted previously uninterested 
groups to join forces with the demonstrators.
The Maidan in Kyiv
In phase two of the protests, the previously 
pro-European rallies changed into anti-gov-
ernment demonstrations, with Kyiv’s Maidan 
becoming the main, or even the only, site of 
protest. A tent city with barricades and a large 
and efficient defence force was subsequently 
erected in the square, attracting comparisons 
to the Zaporizhian Sich1. Opposition activ-
ists also occupied three public buildings. The 
Maidan rallies brought together representa-
tives from a wide range of organisations, par-
ties and groups from different milieux, includ-
ing: the main political parties (Batkivshchyna, 
UDAR, Svoboda), Yuri Lutsenko’s “Third Repub-
lic” movement (Lutsenko has been one of the 
main “technical” organisers of the protests), 
as well as several spontaneously established 
civil groups and groups of regular support-
ers. The Maidan itself has given rise to several 
new movements (including “Free People” and 
“Automaidan”) - which oppose both political 
parties and “old” organisations, and display 
militant tendencies. The effectiveness and the 
staying power of these organisations, however, 
remain uncertain.
The Kiev protests were also unique in that they 
incorporated a significant religious element. 
Within days of the launch of the Maidan ral-
ly, the demonstrators began celebrating mass 
several times a day. Priests representing the 
major religions (with the notable exception of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which recog-
nises the authority of the Moscow Patriarch-
ate) erected prayer tents in the square, and 
1 See: Tymur Lytovchenko, Якою має бути революція ХХІ 
століття, 09.01.2014,. http://glavcom.ua/articles/16640.
html
The protests lacked cohesion, a recognised 
leader, and clear and realistic objectives - 
in contrast to the Maidan rallies staged 
during the Orange Revolution in 2004. This 
led to a number of uncoordinated actions.
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encouraged confession and public prayer. The 
participation of Greek Catholic priests in these 
activities has helped bring the Ukrainian Greek 
Catholic Church another step closer to being 
seen as a national rather than a regional Church 
(despite its numerical minority).
In early December, activists representing 
Ukraine’s opposition political parties made an 
attempt to take control of the Maidan demon-
stration - ignoring the leaders of civil society 
- but their attempts were only partly success-
ful. Although party leaders did eventually be-
come the key speakers at the rally, they were 
forced to share the stage with civil society ac-
tivists, rock stars, folk bands, and parish choirs. 
Consequently, the protests lacked cohesion, 
a recognised leader, and clear and realistic ob-
jectives - in contrast to the Maidan rallies staged 
during the Orange Revolution in 2004. This led 
to a number of uncoordinated actions, such 
as the attempt to block off the main govern-
ment and parliament buildings, and gradually 
left many demonstrators rather discouraged. 
It is likely that the protests would have largely 
fizzled out by mid-December had it not been 
for the crackdown on the Maidan protesters 
carried out jointly by troops from the Interior 
Ministry and the Berkut riot police on the night 
of 10 December. Instead of clearing the square, 
the action prompted an upsurge in public un-
rest and swelled the ranks of the protesters.
Towards the end of December and at the begin-
ning of the New Year, the number of protesters 
began to rapidly decrease, and by mid-Janu-
ary, the permanent group of Maidan activists 
had shrunk to merely several hundred people. 
Marches and rallies organised across the city 
became infrequent. The slump in support for 
the Maidan protests stemmed from fatigue, 
feelings of helplessness, the lack of clear lead-
ership, and the lack of any discernible progress. 
The attack on Yuri Lutsenko on 4 January, as 
opposed to previous cases of force being used 
against protesters, did not spark mass mobili-
sation among the people of Kyiv. Meanwhile, 
despite constant police harassment, Auto-
maidan activists have continued to stage fre-
quent protests, and still enjoy considerable 
public support - the group has been organising 
motorcade protests outside the residences of 
President Yanukovych and other government 
representatives.
The radicalisation of the protests
On the 16 January, the Party of Regions and the 
Communists passed a draft of legislation target-
ing civil society and the freedom of the press, 
breaking constitutional and parliamentary rules 
in the process. On 19 January this led to a rad-
icalisation of the protests and made them more 
violent – a group of several thousand of the most 
radical protesters left the Maidan and made for 
Hrushevskoho street to block parliament and 
government offices. A large proportion of this 
group was made up of members of the Maidan 
self-defence group and nationalists from the 
“Right Sector of the Maidan” and also from Svo-
boda. The demonstrators attacked the cordon of 
the troops of the Interior Ministry and Berkut, the 
special police unit. This resulted in heavy clashes 
and the following three days saw periodic “police 
battles” between the protesters and the security 
forces’ cordon. Berkut’s attack in the morning of 
22 January led to the death of four protesters. 
Although the circumstances surrounding their 
deaths are unclear, political responsibility has 
fallen on the government and the opposition has 
accused parliament that live ammunition was 
used on purpose. Later that day the body of Yuri 
Verbytsky turned up, two days after the Maidan 
activist had been abducted, and the security forc-
es continued arresting activists from the protest 
movement. Also on the 22nd, President Yanu-
kovych took the initiative to hold talks with the 
three opposition leaders (Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, 
Tyahnybok) and these are meant to be continued. 
It is, however, unlikely that these talks will see 
a breakthrough in the current conflict. So far the 
authorities have offered “round table” talks only 
to play for time and not as a realistic attempt to 
resolve the situation.
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The sociological face of the Maidan
The available sociological studies2 show that al-
though the majority of the participants in the 
Kyiv demonstrations were residents of Kyiv, at 
the end of December, as much as 80% of the 
“core group” of Maidan activists came from 
outside the capital (42% from western Ukraine, 
and 31% from central Ukraine3). Approximate-
ly 30% of the “core group” were young pro-
fessionals with a university degree and current 
university students, while industrial workers 
accounted for 14% of the “core group” - com-
pared to just 7% among all the protesters. 
The reported reasons for participation did not 
differ significantly between the core Maidan 
group and the remaining protesters. These in-
cluded: police violence against protesters on 
30 November (70%), rejection of the Associa-
tion Agreement (40%), and a desire for a change 
of government (40%). Only 7% of respondents 
said that their participation was motivated 
by an appeal for support from the opposition 
parties, although 12% admitted that they had 
come to Kyiv following a campaign run by one 
2 We refer mainly to the studies conducted on 7-8 and 
20 December 2013 by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initia-
tives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of 
Sociology, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2013-year/
2013-i--politichni-pidsumki-i-prognozi-zagalnonacio-
nalne-i-ekspertne-opituvannja.htm .The findings of other 
available studies do not differ significantly from the data 
used in this paper, especially after taking into account the 
incomplete representativeness of this type of research.
3 It is possible, however, that this group, as well as the 
current residents of eastern and southern Ukraine, could 
include individuals who have recently relocated there 
from western Ukraine.
of the parties, and 15% said they belonged to 
a political party. The number of people ready 
to form defence groups is of particular inter-
est: 15% among the demonstrators and 21% 
among the “core group” members.
However, those attending the Maidan demon-
strations in Kyiv (or the Euromaidan rallies in 
other cities) represent only one segment of the 
Ukrainian population. They are mainly young - 
often born after Ukraine gained independence 
- well educated, and have a tendency to base 
their future prosperity on close links between 
Ukraine and the EU. They are also familiar with 
modern communication technologies, and 
are either already self-sufficient or are active-
ly striving for financial independence from the 
state. Many of them are Russian-speaking or bi-
lingual, and so language choice did not become 
an important issue at the Maidan protests. 
There are no reliable data on the protesters’ po-
litical views or affiliations at the present time.
The experience of the past few weeks has sig-
nalled the emergence of a new social elite in 
Ukraine, prepared to fight for their interests if 
not yet fully capable of articulating them. The 
new generation has little confidence in poli-
ticians and politics. New media has enabled 
the emerging group to follow and contribute 
to global trends (as part of the “network so-
ciety”). Furthermore, it looks for its symbolic 
roots in national tradition (Zaporizhian Sich, 
UPA traditions). Members of Svoboda, and of 
other nationalist organisations, have been ac-
tively promoting their ideas among this group 
of Ukrainians, albeit in a watered down ver-
sion, without the traditional elements of their 
chauvinistic ideology. It should be noted that 
the UPA is not seen by the Maidan protesters as 
a criminal organisation, or even as an ideological 
one, but rather as a heroic “army of immortals”, 
fighting for Ukraine’s independence. Within 
a short period time, the red-and-black flag of 
the OUN has become a nationwide symbol (as 
opposed to an official state symbol), and the 
traditional UPA greeting: “Glory to Ukraine! 
The experience of the past few weeks has 
signalled the emergence of a new social 
elite in Ukraine, prepared to fight for their 
interests if not yet fully capable of articu-
lating them. The new generation has little 
confidence in politicians and politics.
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Glory to her Heroes!” has become equally 
widespread (albeit with minor changes). As 
a consequence, nationalist attitudes are be-
coming increasingly common, but at the cost of 
a weakening of their radicalism and particularly 
of their xenophobic elements.
Despite the seemingly large scale of the pro-
tests, the “disgruntled” Ukrainians who attend-
ed the Maidan rallies represent a minority group 
among Ukrainian voters. The majority of the 
Ukrainian electorate is made up of manual work-
ers, civil servants, rural residents, and members 
of older generations (including recipients of in-
capacity benefits and state pensions). They live 
mainly (but not exclusively) in the most populous 
eastern and southern regions of the country and 
tend to be apprehensive about their future and 
fearful of change. Their common denominator 
is their passivity and credulity regarding media 
propaganda. Similar attitudes are also present 
in western Ukraine, among Ukrainian speakers. 
It therefore follows that without convincing ar-
guments and objectives that address the needs 
of these groups of voters, the current civil move-
ment cannot succeed4.
Opposition parties and the protests
The leaders of the Ukrainian opposition were 
taken by surprise by the outbreak of the protests 
at the end of November. They felt the demon-
strations were decidedly premature, since their 
own strategic objectives were focused on the 
2015 presidential elections. The opposition par-
ties were also surprised by the aversion of many 
protesters to both the parties themselves and to 
their leaders. This stemmed mainly from the lack 
of credibility of the political opposition and the 
lack of confidence in political decisions among 
the majority of the population. According to an 
opinion poll carried out in late December 2013, 
4 The need for such arguments has been stressed 
by a number of Ukrainian analysts. See, for exam-
ple, Maksym Vikhrov, Чому Схід не з майданом, 
1 Sept 2014, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.
do?chomu_shid_ne_z_maydanom&objectId=1300466 
levels of trust stood at the following levels: Oleh 
Tyahnybok – 58.8%; Arseniy Yatsenyuk – 55.1%; 
Vitali Klitschko – 48.2%; Yuri Lutsenko – 60.1%; 
and Petro Poroshenko – 45.2%5. It appears that 
Yatsenyuk - an “office” politician, a poor public 
speaker, and Batkivshchyna’s “Prince Regent” 
(following Yulia Tymoshenko’s imprisonment) - 
was the most surprised by the protests. Klitschko 
proved more capable of dealing with the new sit-
uation - despite his poor political acumen and or-
atorical skills, as a former athlete Klitschko knew 
how to act at a rally. Nonetheless, he too felt the 
protests were premature and detrimental to the 
behind-the-scenes negotiations on his nomina-
tion as the opposition’s presidential candidate.
Following their initial surprise, the parties at-
tempted to take the reigns - making a series 
of errors in the process. There were also visi-
ble differences of opinion regarding the strat-
egy and objectives. Many of their demands 
and threats were not only unrealistic (for ex-
ample, their calls for a general strike) but also 
ran contrary to their political interests, includ-
ing calls for early presidential and parliamenta-
ry elections. In reality, the opposition were far 
from ready for a snap election - they had not 
produced an election manifesto, and were not 
ready logistically or financially. At the same 
time, the leaders of the opposition ignored 
a number of realistic goals, such as the removal 
5 According to the same opinion poll (conducted by the 
Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation), 61.4% 
of Ukrainians do not trust President Yanukovych, and 
66.2% have no confidence in Prime Minister Azarov. 
http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2013-year/2013-i--poli-
tichni-pidsumki-i-prognozi-zagalnonacionalne-i-ek-
spertne-opituvannja.htm
Following their initial surprise, the par-
ties attempted to take the reigns - making 
a series of errors in the process. There were 
also visible differences of opinion regard-
ing the strategy and objectives. Many of 
their demands and threats were unrealistic. 
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of Mykola Azarov’s government from power or 
a victory in early elections in five single-mem-
ber constituencies (15 December 2013). Regard-
ing the former issue, although the opposition 
did manage to put a vote of no confidence on 
the parliamentary agenda, it did nothing to win 
over the undecided independent and coalition 
MPs. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions success-
fully contained a crisis within its own ranks (see 
below), persuaded the Communists to abstain 
from the vote, and the motion was defeated. 
The opposition’s defeat in the snap elections did 
not come as a complete surprise, since the oppo-
sition parties had done little to win extra seats in 
parliament - mainly because the seats would not 
have been enough to significantly change the 
balance of power in the Verkhovna Rada.
Of the three main opposition parties, only Svo-
boda seems to have clear tactical and strate-
gic goals. For a long time, Batkivshchyna and 
UDAR did not know how to respond to the ral-
lies, and it is likely that they would have wel-
comed the end of the protests since they saw 
them as premature from the point of view of 
their own electoral strategy. It should be noted 
that the more pronounced the rift between the 
two parties, the greater the importance of their 
alliance with Svoboda. A Batkivshchyna-UDAR 
coalition could not work due to the rivalry be-
tween the parties - a third coalition partner 
would act as a stabilising force, especially since 
Svoboda is not looking to enter its own presi-
dential candidate in 2015. However, the coali-
tion is being hamstrung by the increasingly tan-
gible rivalry between the leaders of the three 
parties. Although Yatsenyuk and Klitschko 
have tried to conceal their disagreements, over 
time the tension has become more evident. 
The decision to prioritise preparations for the 
presidential race has laid bare differences of 
opinion between Yatsenyuk and Klitschko with 
regard to the opposition’s election strategy as 
well as their personal presidential ambitions. 
While Batkivshchyna would like to see several 
opposition candidates enter the first round, 
UDAR insists that the opposition must agree on 
a single candidate well ahead of the vote. The 
real dispute, however, boils down to whether 
both Yatsenyuk and Klitschko, or only Klitschko, 
should enter the first round.
Unable to secure a nomination from the op-
position coalition, the leader of Svoboda, Oleh 
Tyahnybok will not run for president; he is, 
however, likely to be active during the pres-
idential campaign. He has found it relatively 
easy to respond to the new circumstances, and 
has treated the protests as an opportunity to 
achieve his party’s main objective - namely, to 
expand its electorate by employing moderate-
ly nationalist slogans which can appeal to new 
social groups and organisations, and the radi-
calisation of Ukrainian society. To this end, Svo-
boda activists, who turned out for the protests 
in large numbers, toned down their chauvinist 
rhetoric and abandoned their anti-European 
slogans entirely.
The ruling camp and the protests
The outbreak of protests and their scale stunned 
the members of the Ukrainian government, 
who for quite some time were unsure about the 
appropriate course of action and attempted to 
play down the significance of the unrest. The 
decision of 30 November to use force against 
the protesters in the Maidan (most probably 
with the approval of President Yanukovych) 
proved to be a mistake not only because it led 
to an upsurge in demonstrations, but also be-
He has found it relatively easy to respond 
to the new circumstances, and has treated 
the protests as an opportunity to achieve 
his party’s main objective - namely, to ex-
pand its electorate by employing moder-
ately nationalist slogans which can appeal 
to new social groups and organisations. 
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cause it caused a split in the ruling elite. One of 
the symptoms of the crisis was the resignation 
of Serhiy Lyovochkin as Yanukovych’s chief of 
staff (though this was refused at that time by 
the president), and the decision by two Party 
of Regions MPs to leave the party. The risk of 
a split in the government became most pro-
nounced at the end of November but was sub-
sequently averted and the ruling elite does not 
at present appear to be in danger of another 
major rift. This has been achieved by buying 
the loyalty of the more pro-opposition groups 
with promises of business licences, or by si-
lencing dissent through threats and blackmail. 
Nonetheless, the Maidan protests have shown 
that the ruling elite is not monolithic, and in 
the event of a serious political crisis in the fu-
ture, divisions in the government could become 
much more serious. The existing disagreements 
have been temporarily muted mainly because 
some groups in the ruling camp concluded 
that the Ukrainian opposition is too weak and 
does not enjoy sufficient public support to pose 
a real challenge to President Yanukovych. Ser-
hiy Lyovochkin was dismissed on 17 January; 
this can be interpreted that those upon whom 
the president is unable to rely will be removed 
from the immediate circle. However, at present 
nothing indicates that further significant dis-
missals will follow.
Following another failed attempt (on the night 
of 10 December) to resolve the Maidan problem 
by force, President Yanukovych and his team 
decided instead to wait out the protests, hop-
ing that inaction would be the best course of 
action. Moreover, the government recognised 
the power of Ukrainian society to organise it-
self and did not feel strong enough to resort 
to mass repressions - perhaps feeling unsure 
of the loyalty of the law enforcement agencies. 
At the same time, the authorities continued to 
harass members of the opposition and tried 
to hamper their activities by introducing a se-
ries of administrative obstacles (as evidenced 
by the problems encountered by the organisers 
of the Euromaidan Forum in Kharkiv on 11-12 
January). The government also used its powers 
to intimidate the protesters, as demonstrated 
by the exceptionally harsh sentence of six years 
in prison for plotting to blow up a statue of 
Lenin in the Ukrainian city of Vasylkiv in early 
2011. Furthermore, it is likely that the govern-
ment is hoping for further disagreements to 
surface within the opposition over its strategy 
(and it will seek to incite them), which would 
undoubtedly significantly weaken the effective-
ness of any actions taken by the opposition. 
The government is aiming to subdue the op-
position and intimidate the general public. Its 
most decisive response to the recent protests to 
date has been the passing of a new legislative 
package by the Verkhovna Rada on 16 January. 
The new law, which was adopted unexpectedly 
and in flagrant violation of parliamentary pro-
cedure and which violates the Ukrainian Con-
stitution, includes restrictions on freedom of 
assembly, imposes high penalties for engaging 
in illegal forms of protest (for example, block-
ading buildings) and increases the state’s ability 
to monitor the Internet.
It seems that the group preventing President 
Yanukovych from adopting more radical solu-
tions to the current crisis are local oligarchs. 
Although Ukrainian oligarchs do not consti-
tute a homogeneous group, nearly all of them 
are fearful of the consequences of potential 
Western sanctions which could be imposed if 
the government were to crush the protests by 
President Yanukovych from adopting more 
radical solutions to the current crisis are lo-
cal oligarchs. Although Ukrainian oligarchs 
do not constitute a homogeneous group, 
nearly all of them are fearful of the con-
sequences of potential Western sanctions 
which could be imposed if the government 
were to crush the protests by force. 
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force. The majority of the oligarchs are pragma-
tists interested in maintaining the political and 
business status quo. In a statement released 
on 13 December, for example, Ukraine’s richest 
man, Rinat Akhmetov, acknowledged the peo-
ple’s right to protest and called for dialogue6. In 
fact, already at the beginning of December, the 
government launched “round table” talks with 
the opposition, chaired by former President 
Leonid Kravchuk. Despite several meetings, the 
initiative failed to produce any significant deci-
sions and was seen rather as a delaying tactic 
employed by Kyiv. The government hoped at 
the time that the protests would gradually die 
down and it launched the talks fully convinced 
that an agreement would not be possible.
Ukrainian politics in the run-up 
to the presidential election
Over the coming months, the presidential elec-
tion scheduled for March 2015 will have a major 
impact on any measures taken by the political 
or civil opposition groups or by the ruling camp. 
The opposition has been trying to institution-
alise the protests, which seems shrewd consid-
ering the imminent collapse of the Maidan rally. 
In late December, civil parties and civil society 
activists formed an All-Ukrainian Maidan (AUM) 
movement, and on 11-12 January civil society 
organisations convened a Euromaidan Forum 
- envisaged as a transition to a new form of 
opposition activity. However, the effectiveness 
of the new structure remains uncertain due to 
a growing conflict between the political parties 
and civil society activists, also with regard to 
election strategy7. Nonetheless, it is likely that 
6 Ахметов призвал политиков «остудить головы» 
и сесть за стол переговоров, 13 Dec. 2013, 
h t t p : / / w w w. u n i a n . n e t / n e w s / 61176 8 - a h m e -
tov-pr izval -vseh-sest-za -s tol -peregovorov.html
7 A similar strategy was adopted in 2001, resulting in 
the formation of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” mo-
vement. The initiative collapsed after it began to be 
taken over by political leaders pursuing conflicting 
programmes and advancing different interests (inc-
luding Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz).
the differences will at least in part be mitigated 
by joint opposition to the legislation adopted on 
16 January by the Verkhovna Rada.
Furthermore, the Maidan protests have brought 
forward preparations for the presidential elec-
tion and have produced a number of new ini-
tiatives and social networks, which may prove 
very useful during the campaign. There are in-
dications that the opposition will fail to agree 
on a single candidate for the first round of the 
presidential elections, and that at least 3-4 can-
didates will enter the race (Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, 
Tyahnybok, Poroshenko). Consequently, the 
Ukrainian opposition will remain divided by its 
divergent interests and the competing ambi-
tions of its leaders and this will translate into 
a less efficient coordination of its activities. This 
will be further compounded by the financial 
problems of the opposition, by increasingly lim-
ited access to the media, as well as by legal and 
administrative obstacles created  by the author-
ities and attempts to discredit the opposition 
leaders in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.
President Viktor Yanukovych’s camp, mean-
while, has launched its campaign for re-elec-
tion, significantly strengthened by its December 
agreement with Russia. The deal has allowed 
Yanukovych to achieve his main objective of se-
curing a large loan and negotiating lower gas 
prices without significant economic and politi-
cal concessions that could cause social discon-
tent (at least in the perspective of the upcom-
ing elections). This will help stabilise the poorly 
performing Ukrainian economy in the run-up to 
the elections, and will leave a significant sur-
plus in the budget - allowing the government 
to increase social spending and to avoid imple-
menting socially painful reforms. In addition to 
the focus on economy, President Yanukovych 
also hopes to ensure victory by further increas-
ing state control of the media, including forcing 
owners of TV channels to provide at best a neu-
tral information service. This, in turn, will pre-
vent opposition parties from gaining access to 
the major television stations in the country. The 
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new laws restricting civil society freedoms and 
the right to protest must also be analysed in the 
context of the upcoming election. Finally, the 
by-elections held on 15 December have shown 
that the government is able to constantly im-
prove its capacity for electoral fraud, including 
the use of large-scale bribery of the general 
public. It is expected that these methods will 
be made use of during the presidential election 
and will inevitably affect the outcome.
Finally, it seems highly probable that the gov-
ernment will try to eliminate Vitali Klitschko 
from the presidential race since, from all the 
opposition candidates, Klitschko has the best 
chance of winning. According to the Ukrainian 
Constitution (Article 103 Section 3) a presi-
dential candidate must have been “domiciled 
in Ukraine for ten years prior to polling day”; 
however, no existing legal act defines the term 
“domiciled”8. In November 2013, the Verkhov-
8 In an interview given in 2013 Vitali Klitschko admitted 
that he has lived in Ukraine since 2007.
na Rada completed amendments to Ukraine’s 
tax code and decided to equate domicile with 
tax residence9. Since Klitschko has not been res-
ident in Ukraine for tax purposes for an uninter-
rupted period of ten years, it is possible that the 
Verkhovna Rada’s interpretation may be used 
to strip him of his right to run for president.
Paradoxically, however, should Klitschko be 
eliminated from the race, this would remove 
one of the main points of contention within the 
Ukrainian opposition, and could result in a fur-
ther consolidation of opposition activities.
The expectations of political and social change 
produced by the Maidan rallies among large 
parts of the Ukrainian public will not disap-
pear and will constitute an important element 
of the upcoming election campaign. At the 
same time, new forms of social organisation 
will make it harder for the current ruling camp 
to govern through repression, confirming that 
Ukraine is not a country in which mass coercion 
will be tolerated. On the other hand, it is also 
likely that the authorities will draw appropriate 
conclusions from the Maidan protests, and that 
this will shape their conduct also following the 
upcoming election. Finally, the rise in social ac-
tivism indicates that, as in 2004, it will be down 
to the Ukrainian people to decide the outcome 
of the election in a run off.
9 Although the provision in question does not refer direct-
ly to electoral law, it is nonetheless permissible to apply 
this particular definition to the entire legal system.
New forms of social organisation will 
make it harder for the current ruling camp 
to govern through repression, confirm-
ing that Ukraine is not a country in which 
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